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Off the Record: The National Security Council,
Drone Killings, and Historical Accountability
Douglas Cox and Ramzi Kassemt
The central and expanding role of the National Security Council in
compiling the "kill list" of U.S. citizens and others approved for drone killing
outside of recognized battlefields highlights the largely overlooked fact that,
since the mid-1990s, the US. government has taken the categorical position
that the National Security Council is exempt from both the documentation
requirements of the Federal Records Act and the disclosure requirements of the
Freedom of Information Act. The current situation undermines long-term
processes of accountability for, and transparency about, drone killings, and
hinders the role of Congress and the courts in providing a check on executive
power. This Article argues that stronger documentation and disclosure
requirements are necessary to restore the National Security Council's
accountability to Congress, the public, and history.
Introduction ............................................... 364
I. Drone Killings and the NSC ............................ ...... 366
A. Standards Reportedly Governing Drone Killings ............. 366
B. Expanding Role of the NSC in Decisions to Kill ............................. 371
II. The NSC, Federal and Presidential Records, and FOIA ...... ....... 373
A. Federal and Presidential Records ................... ..... 373
1. Federal Records ............................ ..... 373
2. Presidential Records.............. .................... 375
B. NSC Records: 194 7-1993 ................................ 376
C. NSC Records: 1993-Present. ...................... ...... 379
III. Documentation and Accountability for Drone Killings ............. 383
A. Killing Outside of Recognized Battlefields Requires
Documentation .................................... 384
B. The Fallout from Limited Documentation .................. 388
IV. Recommendations for NSC Documentary Accountability ..... ...... 392
A. Revisiting Judicial Treatment ofNSC ............... ...... 392
B. Congressional Reassertion ofLegislative Intent.... ......... 395
C. Executive Branch Reevaluation .................... ..... 396
Conclusion......................... .................. 398
363
Yale Journal on Regulation
Introduction
In a speech on May 23, 2013, President Obama defended his
administration's drone killing program-in which National Security Council
(NSC) officials select U.S. citizens and others for inclusion on a "kill list"-
and asserted that it was subject to "clear guidelines, oversight and
accountability."' Just days before this speech, however, the administration
moved to dismiss a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit brought by the
authors of this Article and their students seeking access to-or at least the
preservation of-records documenting the NSC "kill list" determinations to
ensure just the kind of oversight and accountability the President cited.2 In its
filings in the case, the administration not only opposed the disclosure of NSC
records, but also expressly asserted that the President has, and should continue
to have, unfettered discretion to destroy NSC drone killing records. The
President "makes the ultimate decision" to destroy such records, the NSC
argued, "and neither the Archivist, nor the Congress, nor the courts may veto
that decision." 3 This Article explores the long-term implications of these
assertions of executive authority with regard to both transparency and
accountability for drone killings.
Part I discusses the publicly available information on the standards
governing the drone killing program and the NSC's expansive role in
compiling "kill lists" in light of the Constitution and the law of armed conflict.
Uncertainty over the legal standards for the drone killing program and a lack of
transparency highlight the need for thorough documentation as a prerequisite
for meaningful oversight and accountability.
Part II explores the unique history of the NSC's relationship to the Federal
Records Act (FRA) 4 and the FOIA, 5 on the one hand, and to the Presidential
t Douglas Cox is Associate Law Library Professor, City University of New York
School of Law. Ramzi Kassem is Associate Professor of Law, City University of New York School of
Law. The authors extend their gratitude to Mark Maher, whose invaluable research assistance greatly
advanced this Article's progress. For their wise guidance and thoughtful comments, we also owe thanks
to Rebecca Bratspies, Phoebe Clarke, Daniel Herz-Roiphe, Julie Goldscheid, Julie Lim, Andrea
McArdle, Ruthann Robson, Franklin Siegel, and the members of CUNY School of Law's Faculty
Forum.
I. President Obama, Remarks By the President at the National Defense University
(May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-def
ense-university [hereinafter President Obama's May 2013 NDU Speech].
2. See Main St. Legal Servs., Inc. v. Nat'l Sec. Council, 962 F. Supp. 2d 472 (E.D.N.Y.
2013). In August 2013, the district court granted the NSC's motion to dismiss and held that the NSC was
not an agency under the FOIA. The case is currently on appeal at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
3. Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim,
Main Street Legal Servs., Inc., 962 F. Supp. 2d 472 (No. 13 Civ. 948), 2013 WL 3094836, at 7.
4. The Federal Records Act (FRA) is a collection of statutes found in Title 44 of the
U.S. Code. See discussion infra Subsection II.A. I.
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
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Records Act (PRA),6 on the other. Since the early 1990s, the U.S. government
has taken the position that the NSC is categorically exempt from both the
documentation requirements of the FRA and the disclosure requirements of the
FOIA.7 Instead, the U.S. government subjects all NSC records to the far less
stringent and nearly unenforceable requirements of the PRA. As a result, there
currently may be more exacting legal requirements to create and preserve
records documenting the decision to grant or deny Social Security benefits to a
U.S. citizen than to record a debate within the NSC about the monumental act
of targeting a U.S. citizen outside of a battlefield for a lethal strike using a
pilotless aerial drone. 9
Part III describes the need for more extensive records and the significant
consequences of limited documentation and disclosure requirements governing
the NSC's role in the drone killing program. The current state of affairs, with
diminished transparency and impaired accountability, carries important
implications for the expansion of executive power. It undermines the ability to
assess, evaluate, and, where appropriate, hold accountable the U.S. government
for drone killings. The information vacuum hinders courts adjudicating
wrongful death suits by family members of those killed due to the program,
current and future government officials deliberating whether to continue the
program, Congress evaluating whether to impose limits on the program, and
future historians studying the period in U.S. history when senior government
officials selected individuals for lethal targeting beyond the borders.
Of course, given recent court decisions, the possibility of meaningful
judicial recourse in U.S. courts regarding drone killings appears limited.
Judicial avenues of accountability and transparency have proven mostly
impassable to those who have sought to learn more about the drone killing
program or to impose an outside check on the executive branch's ability to act
unilaterally and irreversibly.' 0  Far from trivializing the importance of
documentation, these realities further highlight how essential documentation is
for future administrations and long-term processes of historical accountability.
Part IV therefore argues that courts should reject the flawed D.C. Circuit
ruling that exempted the NSC from the FRA and the FOIA; that Congress
6. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207 (2012).
7. See Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(finding that the NSC is not subject to either the FRA or the FOIA).
8. Id.
9. While this Article focuses on killings using pilotless and armed aircrafts, or
weaponized drones, because that is where much of the ongoing public debate has focused, our
arguments apply equally to decisions by the same governmental body to kill persons outside of
recognized battlefields using any modality (e.g., surface-to-surface missiles, air-to-surface missiles,
seabome missiles, special operations teams, lone assassins, or other means).
10. See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 12-1192, 2014 WL 1352452 (D.D.C. Apr. 4,
2014) (dismissing a wrongful death lawsuit seeking damages on behalf of the estates of individuals
killed in drone strikes); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing a lawsuit
seeking an injunction against the drone killing of plaintiff's son).
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should expressly reassert its original legislative intent that the NSC be subject
to both regimes; and that the executive branch should institutionalize robust
recordkeeping for the NSC's role in killings outside of recognized battlefields,
all in order to ensure a measure of accountability to Congress, the public, and
history.
I. Drone Killings and the NSC
Statements of senior officials and press reports have cast light on the
extensive role of the NSC in the day-to-day coordination of drone killings.
Leading-and working as part of-an interagency team, the NSC actively
participates in sifting through raw intelligence, vetting lists, and selecting the
names of targets for final approval. The NSC's role, the standards that purport
to govern drone killing determinations, and the lack of transparency in the
process all illustrate the importance of meaningful documentation.
A. Standards Reportedly Governing Drone Killings
A U.S. Department of Justice White Paper leaked to the press in February
2013 sets forth "the circumstances in which the U.S. government could use
lethal force in a foreign country outside the area of active hostilities against a
U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al-Qa'ida or an associated
force."1 2
11. See, e.g., John Brennan, Answers to Questions for the Record from Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (Feb. 2013), http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130207/posthearing.pdf
(stating that the "process of deciding" to take the "extraordinary action" of drone killing involves "a
discussion among the departments and agencies across our national security team" including "the
relevant National Security Council Principals"); The Process Behind Targeted Killing, WASH. POST,
Oct. 23, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-process-behind-targeted-kill
ing/2012/10/23/4420644c-1d26-1le2-ba3l-3083ca97c314_graphic.html (stating that the Deputies
Committee of the NSC "culls the rosters" of individuals for targeting); Mark Hosenball, Secret Panel
Can Put Americans on "Kill List ", REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2011, 7:59 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/05/us-cia-killlist-idUSTRE79475C20111005 (stating that
"targeting recommendations are drawn up by a committee of mid-level NSC officials" that are then sent
to "the panel of NSC 'principals'); Daniel Klaidman, John Brennan, Obama's CIA Chief Nominee,
Could Restrain the Agency, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 5, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/john-bre
nnan-obamas-cia-chief-nominee-could-restrain-agency-63317 (stating that the NSC's Counterterrorism
Security Group "work[s] through individual targeting 'nominations"').
12. Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior
Operational Leader of Al-Qa'ida or An Associated Force, U.S. DEP'T JUST. 1,
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/ilmsnbc/sections/news/020413 DOJ White Paper.pdf [hereinafter DOJ
White Paper]. The legal justification for the killing of Anwar al-Awlaqi, an American citizen, is
included in another memorandum. The Second Circuit recently held in a FOIA lawsuit that the
government was required to disclose a redacted version of the memorandum. New York Times Co. v.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 13-422, 2014 WL 1569514 (2d Cir. Apr. 21, 2014). In addition to the
memorandum specifically justifying the killing of al-Awlaqi, President Obama subsequently agreed to
disclose eleven classified memoranda to certain members of Congress in the wake of a filibuster of John
Brennan's confirmation as Director of the CIA. John Swaine, Drones Overshadow John Brennan's
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The White Paper identifies three conditions for such use of lethal force.
First, the targeted individual must pose "an imminent threat of violent attack
against the United States;" second, capture must be "infeasible;" and, third, the
operation must be "conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of
war principles."' 3 A fourth, framing condition articulated by the executive
branch requires that the targeted individual be "a senior operational leader,"
that is to say an al-Qaida (or associated force) leader "actively engaged in
planning operations to kill Americans."l 4
According to the Justice Department, the underlying authority for such
lethal operations is manifold. The White Paper points to the Constitution and
the responsibility it places on the President to protect the country against
imminent threats to justify the use of lethal force outside of recognized
battlefields. 5 The government also relies on the right of nations to defend
themselves under international law and on the Authorization for Use of
Military Force (AUMF), enacted by Congress in 2001.16 This authorization
empowers the United States to take actions against those organizations that
helped carry out the 9/11 attacks." Because al-Qaida is a non-state actor and
employs non-traditional methods of warfare, the administration has interpreted
its mandate under the AUMF to authorize unconventional methods of warfare
outside of zones of hostilities, including the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. 8
The executive branch interprets these self-selected limitations broadly,
leaving crucial details unclear. For example, the executive branch draws on "a
broader concept of imminence," one that "does not require the United States to
have clear evidence that a specific attack . . . will take place in the immediate
13. DOJ White Paper, supra note 12, at 16; see also Eric Holder, Address at
Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/201
2/ag-speech-1203051.html [hereinafter Holder Northwestern Speech]. On the issue of the law of armed
conflict and drone killings, see generally NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2008); Laurie R. Blank, After "Top Gun": How Drone Strikes Impact the Law of War, 33 U. PA. J.
INT'L L. 675 (2012); and John C. Harwood, Knock, Knock; Who's There? Announcing Targeted Killing
Procedures and the Law ofArmed Conflict, 40 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1 (2012).
14. DOJ White Paper, supra note 12, at 1; see also Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo
Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world
/middleeast/secret-us-memo-made-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html.
15. DOJ White Paper, supra note 12, at 1; see also Jeh C. Johnson, General Counsel,
Dep't of Def., Dean's Lecture at Yale Law School, National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in
the Obama Administration (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/02/jeh-johnson-speech-at
-yale-law-school [hereinafter Johnson Yale Speech]; Harold H. Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State,
Address to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The Obama
Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/13911
9.htm [hereinafter Koh ASIL Speech].
16. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001). DOJ White Paper, supra note 12, at 2; see also Johnson Yale Speech, supra note 15; Koh ASIL
Speech, supra note 15.
17. See Johnson Yale Speech, supra note 15; Koh ASIL Speech, supra note 15.
18. See Holder Northwestern Speech, supra note 13. On the geographic scope of the
"hot" battlefield, see generally Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for
Detention and Targeting Outside the "Hot" Conflict Zone, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1165 (2013); and
Michael W. Lewis, Drones and the Boundaries ofthe Battlefield, 47 TEX. INT'L L.J. 293 (2012).
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future."19 Moreover, continuous involvement in the planning of attacks can
suffice to meet the condition of imminence, as can recent involvement in such
planning, in the absence of evidence that the individual has "renounced or
,,20abandoned such activities.
The feasibility of capture is also interpreted broadly, hinging on such
discretionary considerations as whether capture can be effected "during the
relevant window of opportunity" and whether capture would pose an "undue
21risk" to U.S. personnel. Publicly available examples raise questions about the
application of this standard. The decision to kill Anwar al-Awlaki by drone
attack rather than attempting to capture him furnishes one such instance.22 U.S.
intelligence had reportedly tracked al-Awlaki to a specific house in Yemen
where he had stayed for an extended period before the strike.23 That capture
was not attempted in that scenario can be difficult to reconcile with the
deployment of U.S. personnel on the ground in Pakistan, without the Pakistani
government's knowledge or consent, to storm the compound of Osama bin
Laden in an attempt to capture or kill him. 24
In relation to the law of armed conflict, the White Paper asserts adherence
to "the four fundamental law-of-war principles governing the use of force:
necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity," but precisely how these
principles are construed in the context of drone killings is unclear. 25
In his May 23, 2013 speech, President Obama clarified slightly the
executive branch's interpretation of one of those principles, stating that "before
any strike is taken, there must be near certainty that no civilians will be killed
or injured, the highest standard we can set." 26 Yet crucial questions remain
about how that standard is implemented and enforced. Assertions by unnamed
U.S. officials that "only members of al-Qaida" were killed in a controversial
drone strike on a group of vehicles driving to a wedding in Yemen in December
19. DOJ White Paper, supra note 12, at 7.
20. Id. at 8; see also Savage, supra note 14.
21. DOJ White Paper, supra note 12, at 8; see also Holder Northwestern Speech, supra
note 13.
22. For a discussion of the targeting of Al-Awlaki, see generally Robert Chesney, Who
May be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the International Regulation of Lethal Force, 13
Y.B. INT'L HUM. L. 3 (2010).
23. See DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE SOUL
OF THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY 263 (2012) (stating that just prior to killing al-Awlaqi, U.S. intelligence
had tracked him to al-Jawf province, Yemen, where he had "stayed in the same house for two weeks").
24. Peter Baker et al., Bin Laden is Dead, Obama Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/osama-bin-laden-is-killed.html. Another lethal attack
reportedly raised concerns with the Department of Defense that lethal targeting rather than attempted
capture was chosen to avoid "tangled and politically fraught detention issues." KLAIDMAN, supra note
23, at 126 (noting that Jeh Johnson, General Counsel for the Department of Defense, had "conducted his
own inquiry" into whether Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan had been killed rather than captured in Somalia due
to detention concerns).
25. DOJ White Paper, supra note 12, at 8; see Holder Northwestern Speech, supra note
13.
26. President Obama's May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 1.
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2013 has further raised questions about how the U.S. government makes such
assessments. 27
In a letter to Congress on May 22, 2013, Attorney General Eric Holder
also briefly elaborated on the executive branch's understanding of the four law-
of-war principles, defining necessity as "the requirement that the target have
definite military value"; distinction as "the idea that only military targets may
be intentionally targeted"; proportionality as "the notion that the anticipated
collateral damage of an action cannot be excessive in relation to the anticipated
concrete and direct military advantage"; and humanity as the requirement "to
use weapons that will not inflict unnecessary suffering." 28 But, owing to the
dearth of detail on the application of these principles to drone killings, the
executive branch's interpretation of these restrictions-and how that
understanding compares to that of the public at large or that of the international
community-remains largely unknown.
Even the fourth condition-that a targeted individual be a leader in al-
Qaida or an associated force-evades firm grasp. Independent verification that
a targeted individual is or was a leader in al-Qaida or an associated force can be
quite challenging given the often clandestine nature of such organizations.
Moreover, the U.S. government has deemed its list of associated forces with
which the United States is presently at war to be classified, withholding it from
public view.29 One senior U.S. official even questioned under oath whether
such a list even existed. 30 Finally, President Obama called into question
whether this remains a limiting factor by omitting any reference to "senior
operational leaders" when he addressed drone killings in his May 2013
speech. 31 A factsheet released by the White House on the same day as that
speech also did not confine targeting to senior operational leaders.32 To many
27. See Kimberly Dozier, Report: US Drone May Have Killed Dozen Civilians,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 20, 2014, 9:27 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/report-us-drone-may-have-k
illed-dozen-civilians (stating that the U.S. government had conducted two investigations of the drone
strike). The statements by U.S. officials were in response to a report by Human Rights Watch that found
that "some, if not all, of those killed and wounded were civilians." A Wedding That Became a Funeral:
US Drone Attack on Marriage Procession in Yemen, HUM. RTS. WATCH 1 (2014),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/yemen0214_ForUpload_0.pdf.
28. Letter from Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., to Patrick Leahy, Senator (May 22, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/slideshow/AG-letter-5-22-13.pdf [hereinafter Holder May 2013 Letter]; see also
Holder Northwestern Speech, supra note 13.
29. See Cora Currier, Who Are We at War With? That's Classified, PROPUBLICA (July
26, 2013, 10:13 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/who-are-we-at-war-with-thats-classified.
30. Michael Sheehan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict, stated that he was "not sure there is a list per se." Hearing to Receive Testimony on
the Law of Armed Conflict, the Use of Military Force, and the 2001 Authorization for the Use of
Military Force Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 113th Cong. 9 (2013).
31. President Obama's May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 1.
32. Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in
Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas ofActive Hostilities, WHITE HOUSE 2
(May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/2013.05.23 fact sheet on_ppg.pdf
(describing the use of lethal force "against a senior operational leader of a terrorist organization or the
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observers, the changes suggested that the U.S. government might be
"broadening the potential target set."33
In his May 2013 speech, President Obama announced that he had signed a
Presidential Policy Guidance governing the use of force outside recognized
battlefields and codifying "clear guidelines, oversight and accountability." 34
The related White House factsheet also stated that the conditions that had
previously applied only to the targeting of U.S. citizens outside of recognized
battlefields would henceforth extend to all uses of lethal force "outside the
United States and outside areas of active hostilities," irrespective of the targeted
individual's nationality.35 Where a U.S. citizen was the target, the executive
branch would "conduct an additional legal analysis to ensure" compliance with
the Constitution and applicable statutes.36
Undermining the entire system of procedures for what the U.S.
government and many commentators refer to as "targeted" killings, however, is
the availability of so-called "signature strikes." This type of lethal U.S.
government action outside of recognized battlefields escapes-and, arguably,
swallows-the aforementioned criteria. Indeed, "signature strikes" do not target
specific, identified individuals who pose a continuing threat, but are based
instead on general patterns of behavior observed remotely. 37
Moreover, recent reports that individuals killed in drone strikes are often
located by tracking the "mobile phone a person is believed to be using" rather
"than confirming a target's identity with operatives or informants on the
ground" also highlight an apparent disconnect between the U.S. government's
declared principles and their application. The risk of error with that approach
is elevated owing in part to the frequency with which mobile telephones and
numbers can change owners, particularly in the developing world.
Finally, males of "military age" within the same area as a known militant
being intentionally targeted are reportedly assumed to be militants themselves,
and subject to lawful killing.39 As a result, the executive branch does not count
forces that organization is using or intends to use to conduct terrorist attacks") (emphasis added)
[hereinafter White House Policy Standards and Procedures].
33. Lesley Clark & Jonathan W. Landay, Obama Speech Suggests Possible Expansion
ofDrone Killings, MCCLATCHY DC (May 23, 2013), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/05/23/192081
/obama-promises-anew-to-transfer.html.
34. President Obama's May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 1.
35. White House Policy Standards and Procedures, supra note 32.
36. Id.
37. Greg Miller, White House Approves Broader Yemen Drone Campaign, WASH.
POST, Apr. 25, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/white-house-approves-br
oader-yemen-drone-campaign/2012/04/25/glQA82U6hT-story.html; see also Daniel Klaidman, The
Silent Killer, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 1, 2012, 1:02 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/drones-silent-killers-64909.
38. Jeremy Scahill & Glenn Greenwald, The NSA 's Secret Role in the U.S.
Assassination Program, INTERCEPT (Feb. 10, 2014, 12:03 AM), https://firstlook.org/theinterceptlarticle
/2014/02/1 0/the-nsas-secret-role.
39. Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret "Kill List" Proves a Test of Obama 's Principles
and Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in
370
Vol. 31, 2014
The NSC, Drone Killings, and Historical Accountability
40their deaths as civilian casualties. This, too, calls into question the U.S.
government's compliance with its self-imposed limitations, including the
principles of necessity, distinction, and proportionality.41
As described above, the criteria publicly articulated by the U.S.
government remain amorphous, malleable, and, at times, unclear, affording the
executive branch significant discretion and flexibility in targeting and
execution. Moreover, those criteria are but the tip of the iceberg. Much of the
executive branch's legal rationale for targeting and its application in specific
42cases remains secret-even when the target is a U.S. citizen. For example, a
legal memorandum issued by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel
approving the killing of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaqi was not even shared with
Congress until February 2013, despite repeated requests. 43 The memorandum
remains classified and has not been disclosed to the public." The lack of public
information only further underscores the importance of rigorous documentation
as a prerequisite to most forms of meaningful accountability.
B. Expanding Role of the NSC in Decisions to Kill
The footprint of the NSC and the National Security Staff (NSS) in the
implementation of drone killing has grown significantly in recent years. The
NSC has long had a role in deciding who will ultimately be added to the U.S.
government's "kill list," but some of the most crucial decision-making
previously took place in interagency meetings chaired by the military.45 Indeed,
until 2011, a committee led by the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had
generally coordinated the process around drone killings outside of recognized
-war-on-al-qaeda.html.
40. Id.
41. The use of signature strikes is in flux apparently due to criticism of the program.
Recently, the Obama administration has reportedly ceased to use signature strikes in Pakistan, relying
solely on "targeted" strikes of high value targets. Kathy Gannon & Sebastian Abbot, Criticism Alters US
Drone Program in Pakistan, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 25, 2013, 1:29 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article
/criticism-alters-us-drone-program-pakistan.
42. Savage, supra note 14.
43. Charlie Savage, A Not-Quite Confirmation of a Memo Approving Killing, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/us/a-not-quite-confirmation-of-a-memo-appr
oving-killing.html; Krishnadev Calamur, Justice Department to Share Secret Drone Memo With
Congress, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 6, 2013, 8:28 PM), http://www.npr.orgfblogs/thetwo-way/2013/02/0
6/171330145/justice-department-to-share-secret-drone-memo-with-congress.
44. In April 2014, the Second Circuit held that the government must disclose a redacted
version of the memorandum in response to a FOIA lawsuit. New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, No. 13-422, 2014 WL 1569514 (2d Cir. Apr. 21, 2014). The memorandum, however, has not yet
been disclosed.
45. Greg Miller, Plan for Hunting Terrorists Signals U.S. Intends to Keep Adding
Names to Kill Lists, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-securi
ty/plan-for-hunting-terrorists-signals-us-intends-to-keep-adding-names-to-kill-lists/2012/10/23/4789b2a
e-18b3-ll e2-a55c-39408fbe6a4b story.html (stating that meetings on targeting had previously been
chaired by military representatives).
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46battlefields. That group would hold regular videoconference calls to examine
target lists. 47 Starting in 2011, however, the NSC began pulling those
discussions more firmly under its grip.48 By 2012, the White House altogether
eliminated the redundancy between the Department of Defense and the NSC in
vetting the names on U.S. target lists, favoring the NSC for that role.49 Part of
the rationale for the shift was that the "process shouldn't be run by those who
pull the trigger on the strikes."50
Based on statements by senior officials and other sources, lower-level
recommendations and analysis from various intelligence agencies and the
military are used to generate an initial list of targets for consideration. 5  The
lists are reviewed at regular intervals during mid-level NSC meetings involving
representatives from agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Department of State, and the Joint Special Operations Command.52 Targeting
recommendations are then sent to the NSC "principals" committee, which
includes deputy directors and other senior officials from various civilian,
military, and intelligence agencies.53
The NSC and its committees appear, therefore, to wield the most control
over the final composition of the U.S. government's kill list. The President's
role in the process is unclear and, in any event, seems rather limited.54 The
Justice Department White Paper on killings outside of recognized battlefields,
for example, does not on its face require presidential approval, but only
authorization "by an informed, high-level official."55
46. Id.; Karen DeYoung, A CIA Veteran Transforms U.S. Policy, WASH. POST, Oct. 24,
2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-veteran-john-brennan-has-transforme
d-us-counterterrorism-policy/2012/10/24/318b8eec-lc7c-1 I e2-ad9O-ba5920e56eb3_story.html.
47. Miller, supra note 45.
48. DeYoung, supra note 46.
49. Miller, supra note 45.
50. Id.
51. For example, the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC), known as the
"keeper of the criteria," sifts through U.S. government databases to develop a list of targets that are then
submitted to an NSC panel. Miller, supra note 45; see also Klaidman, supra note II (stating that the
NCTC profiles "potential targets" and the NSC Counterterrorism Security group considers "individual
targeting 'nominations"'). The procedures lower-level military and intelligence officials follow, at least
on paper, to compile and analyze targets have been described in some detail. See generally Gregory S.
McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEO. L.J. 681 (2013).
52. Miller, supra note 45; see also Hosenball, supra note I1.
53. Miller, supra note 45; see also Hosenball, supra note 11 (noting that
recommendations from the mid-level NSC panel is sent to NSC "principals").
54. Hosenball, supra note II (stating that the NSC "kill" panel "informs the president
of its decisions" and that the "role of the president in ordering or ratifying a decision to target a decision
is fuzzy"). According to a "former official," one of the reasons for making senior NSC "officials
principally responsible for nominating Americans for the target list was to 'protect' the president." Id.
55. DOJ White Paper, supra note 12, at 9.
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II. The NSC, Federal and Presidential Records, and FOIA
The central role of the NSC in the drone killing process highlights the
complicated relationship between the NSC and federal recordkeeping and
disclosure laws. For decades, the NSC complied with both the documentation
requirements of the Federal Records Act and the disclosure requirements of the
Freedom of Information Act.56 In 1994, however, during litigation involving
NSC records, the Clinton administration suddenly changed course. It asserted
that the NSC was categorically exempt from the FRA and the FOIA, and
declared instead that NSC records would, going forward, be subject only to the
much less stringent standards of the Presidential Records Act.57 In 1996, a
sharply divided D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Clinton
administration's asserted NSC exclusion, which established the current state of
affairs, and significantly affected the documentation of NSC deliberations on
drone killings.58
A. Federal and Presidential Records
Two distinct regimes govern federal recordkeeping and disclosure: one
governs the records of federal agencies, and the other governs presidential
records. The two regimes are mutually exclusive; a record may be a federal
record or a presidential record, but it cannot be both.59 The difference between
the two regimes in terms of documentation and disclosure requirements as well
as the availability of judicial review is significant.
1. Federal Records
The creation, management, and disposition of agency records is governed
by a collection of statutes collectively known as the Federal Records Act
(FRA).60 The disclosure of such federal records, in turn, is governed by the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).61 Together these two statutory regimes
create a thorough, and judicially enforceable, framework for federal records.
56. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
57. Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 877 F. Supp. 690, 694 (D.D.C. 1995).
58. Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
59. The Presidential Records Act, for example, expressly excludes from the definition
of "presidential records" any "official records of an agency." 44 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012). The two regimes
are not, however, jointly exhaustive in that documents can also be "nonrecords" or personal records. See
36 C.F.R. §§ 1222.14, 1220.20 (2013).
60. Relevant statutory provisions derive from the Records Disposal Act of 1943, Pub.
L. No. 78-115, 57 Stat. 380 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3301-14), the Federal Records Act of
1950, Pub. L. No. 81-754, § 6, 64 Stat. 578 (codified as amended at chapters 21, 25, 27, 29 and 31 of
Title 44), and the Federal Records Management Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-575, 90 Stat.
2724 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907).
61. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
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First, the FRA creates an affirmative duty on agencies to create records by
requiring that agencies "shall make and preserve records containing adequate
and proper documentation of the organization, functions, policies, decisions,
procedures, and essential transactions of the agency" and requiring that those
records be "designed to furnish the information necessary to protect the legal
and financial rights of the Government and of persons directly affected by the
agency's activities."62 Such a broad statutory duty prevents, in principle,
agencies from undertaking significant activities "off the record."
Second, agencies must preserve all federal records that they create and
may only destroy them pursuant to schedules of records, which must be
approved by the Archivist of the United States, and which provide record
retention periods that can range from immediate destruction to permanent
preservation.63 These disposition schedules are the exclusive method for
approving the disposal of federal records. Any destruction of federal records
outside this process may therefore violate federal law. 4
Third, agency records are immediately subject to the disclosure regime of
the FOIA pursuant to which agencies are required, subject to exemptions and
exceptions, to provide copies of agency records to requesters within twenty
working days. FOIA requests can also have a secondary impact on the record
preservation requirements. An agency is required, for example, to retain
records requested through the FOIA until the request and any related litigation
and appeals are complete, even if the records could have otherwise been
destroyed pursuant to an approved records schedule. 66
Finally, compliance with both the FRA and the FOIA may be subject to
extensive judicial review. FOIA expressly provides a right of action to police
67failures to comply with its mandates. For the FRA, courts have recognized
that individuals whose interests are harmed by an agency's non-compliance
have standing to force the agency to fulfill its statutory responsibilities. 68
62. 44 U.S.C. § 3101 (2012) (emphasis added).
63. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3303-3303a (2012); see also NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN.,
DISPOSITION OF FEDERAL RECORDS: A RECORDS MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 88-112 (1997) (describing
the process for compiling records schedules for temporary and permanent records).
64. 44 U.S.C. § 3314 (2012) (describing the "exclusive" procedures for submitting
records schedules and stating that "records of the United States Government may not be alienated or
destroyed except under this chapter").
65. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
66. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., General Records Schedule 14, Item 11,
http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/grs/grsl4.html (Apr. 2010) (defining retention periods for the
"official file copy" of a record requested under the FOIA).
67. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
68. See, e.g., Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29,41 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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2. Presidential Records
In contrast, the creation, management, disposition, and disclosure of
presidential records are governed by the Presidential Records Act (PRA),
which imposes significantly less strict requirements than the FRA. Under the
PRA, the President has near complete authority over presidential records
management, including unfettered discretion on the threshold question of
whether documents are, or are not, presidential records subject to the PRA.
Judicial oversight is extremely limited.
First, on creation, the PRA states that the President "shall take all such
steps as may be necessary to assure that the activities, deliberations, decisions,
and policies that reflect the performance of his constitutional, statutory, or other
official or ceremonial duties are adequately documented." 69 Unlike the
corresponding FRA standard, the PRA does not require that this documentation
be sufficient to protect the legal rights of individuals affected by government
activities. Even more importantly, the D.C. Circuit has held that the President's
more limited obligation to document presidential action is not subject to
-70judicial review.
Second, the PRA has significantly less stringent restrictions on the
destruction of presidential records than its FRA counterpart.71 While the PRA
requires that the President seek the "advice" of the Archivist of the United
States on the possible destruction of presidential records, such "advice" is
nonbinding. 72 Moreover, and more crucially, the President alone determines
whether or not records satisfy the requirements for the definition of
"Presidential records" in the first place.73 That is, the President could exempt
69. 44 U.S.C. § 2203 (2012).
70. See Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(noting that while "record-keeping requirements of the FRA are subject to judicial review and
enforcement; those of the PRA are not").
71. See id. (noting that while both FRA and PRA "require the preservation of records,
the procedures to prevent improper destruction of documents covered by the FRA are significantly more
demanding").
72. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c)-(e) (2012); see Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 924
F.2d 282, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Although the President must notify the Archivist before disposing of
records and the Archivist may inform Congress of the President's desire to dispose of the records,
neither the Archivist nor the Congress has the authority to veto the President's disposal decision.").
73. 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2) (2012). The General Counsel of the National Archives and
Records Administration has noted that the National Archives has "no formal role on the threshold
question of whether particular documents or information do or do not constitute 'presidential records' as
defined under the PRA." Supplemental Declaration of Gary M. Stern at 3, Citizens for Responsibility &
Ethics in Wash. v. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., 583 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 07-48).
Agencies also have discretion in determining whether agency documents constitute records. See, e.g., 36
C.F.R. § 1222.10 (2013) (defining documentary material "appropriate for preservation" as federal
records as those materials that "in the judgment of the agency should be . . .maintained by an agency").
This power is nevertheless more circumscribed than the President's power in relation to presidential
records. First, guidance and direction about what ought to constitute an agency record is both more
extensive and more clearly defined. Second, questionable judgments about what constitutes an agency
record are, unlike with presidential records, subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Exec.
Office of the President, I F.3d 1274, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (rejecting the government's contention that
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documents from the requirements of the PRA by simply determining that they
do not satisfy the definition of "Presidential records." 74
Finally, Presidential records are not subject to the mandatory disclosure
requirements of the FOIA during a Presidential administration. Access is
delayed at least until a President has left office and may be significantly limited
long after that time. 75 Under the PRA, the Archivist of the United States
assumes "responsibility for the custody, control, and preservation of, and
access to, the Presidential records" when a President leaves office. While the
Archivist has an "affirmative," although not clearly defined, "duty to make
such records available to the public as rapidly and completely as possible,"76
the records are generally withheld for at least five years after the administration
has ended, at which point they can be made available subject to the exemptions
and exceptions of the FOIA.77 However, for several enumerated categories of
information in presidential records, the President can restrict access for up to
twelve years. And, again, even this delayed access applies only to documents
that the President has, in his discretion, determined to be "presidential records"
subject to the PRA and has elected not to destroy during his administration.
B. NSC Records: 194 7-1993
The relationship between NSC records and the mutually exclusive
regimes of federal and presidential records has a complicated history. The NSC
was originally created by the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequently
became part of the Executive Office of the President during a reorganization in
1949.79 Following the passage of the FRA in 1950 and both the original FOIA
in 1966 and the FOIA amendments in 1974, the NSC considered itself an
"agency" subject to the FRA's documentation requirements and the FOIA's
disclosure requirements. This was based on the plain language of the statutory
"agency heads have sweeping discretion to decide which documents" constitute records and holding that
federal records laws "surely cannot be read to allow the agency by fiat" to declare that "an entire set of
substantive e-mail documents" are not records).
74. See 44 U.S.C.§ 2201(2) (defining "Presidential records").
75. See Armstrong, 90 F.3d at 556 (noting that "the joint regime of the FRA and the
FOIA can affect a president's daily operations during his term of office, while the PRA is applicable to a
president's papers only after he has left office.").
76. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(f)(1) (2012).
77. See id. § 2204(c)(1) (stating that presidential records will generally be
"administered in accordance with section 552 of title 5, United States Code" with certain exceptions).
78. See id § 2204(a) (listing classified information, trade secrets, and confidential
communications "between the President and his advisers" as such categories).
79. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of titles 10 and 50 of the U.S. Code); Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1949,
14 Fed. Reg. 5227, 63 Stat. 1067 (transferring NSC to the Executive Office of the President).
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definition of "agency," passed in 1974, which expressly includes
establishments within the Executive Office of the President.80
The legislative history of the 1974 amendments also supports the
conclusion that Congress intended to treat the NSC as an agency. In particular,
the House report on the 1974 FOIA amendment expressly stated that the "term
'establishment in the Executive Office of the President,' as used in this
amendment, includes such functional entities as . . . the National Security
Council.' Moreover, when the House and Senate versions of the 1974
amendments went to conference, the conference report noted, in a section
entitled "Expansion of Agency Definition," that the House version was broader
than the Senate version and stated that "the conference substitute follows the
House bill."82
Shortly after the passage of the 1974 definition of "agency," the NSC
acknowledged that it was an agency by proposing FOIA regulations "under the
authority of' the FOIA. A month later, the NSC promulgated final FOIA
regulations." The NSC thereafter administered an active FOIA program and
was a defendant in multiple FOIA lawsuits in which the NSC accepted that it
was subject to the FOIA.
The NSC also complied with the FRA. The NSC submitted a number of
record schedules seeking the approval of the Archivist of the United States for
80. 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1) (2012) (defining "agency" to include "an executive
department" or "other establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive
Office of the President)").
81. H.R. REP. No. 93-876, at 8 (1974) (emphasis added). The report further added that
the intent was to include even entities that might not satisfy the older definition of "agency" under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1), but which nevertheless "perform governmental
functions and control information of interest to the public." Id.
82. H.R. REP.NO. 93-1380, at 14 (1974) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added).
83. Freedom of Information Fees, 40 Fed. Reg. 3,612 (Jan. 23, 1975).
84. See 32 C.F.R. pt. 2101 (1990) (outlining FOIA processing procedures, fee
schedules and declassification and release procedures "to the extent" that FOIA "is applicable to the
National Security Council Staff'). The FOIA regulations were initially promulgated in 1975. 40 Fed.
Reg. 7,316 (Feb. 19, 1975). Despite the fact that the regulations were withdrawn, a provision remains in
the Code of Federal Regulations that relates solely to the NSC FOIA regulations. See 3 C.F.R. § 101.4
(2012) ("Freedom of Information regulations for the National Security Council appear at 32 C.F.R. Ch.
XXI."). The NSC also promulgated Privacy Act regulations that remain in force. 32 C.F.R. pt. 2101.
This is relevant because the Privacy Act applies only to an "agency" and incorporates the FOIA's
definition of agency. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(1) (stating that "the term 'agency' means agency as
defined" in the FOIA).
85. See, e.g., Willens v. Nat'l Sec. Council, 726 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1989) (reviewing
a FOIA request for NSC records); Halperin v. Nat'l Sec. Council, 452 F. Supp. 47 (D.D.C. 1978)
(same).
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the disposition of its records.86 Like other agencies, the NSC transferred older
records to the National Archives when they were no longer in current use.
In 1978, Congress passed the PRA. As mentioned above, presidential
records and agency records are mutually exclusive given that the PRA excludes
from its coverage agency records subject to the FOIA.89 Contemporaneous with
the passage of the PRA, Counsel for the President requested that the
Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) directly address the
issue of the status of the NSC as an "agency." The OLC noted that under
"conventional standards of statutory interpretation" a court would be "justified"
in holding "on the basis of the unambiguous language of the [FOIA]" and the
legislative history that the NSC was an agency. 90 The OLC concluded that "in
general" the NSC "is an Agency for [FOIA] purposes." 91
While the executive branch uniformly treated the NSC as an agency, there
was a limited exception. Given that certain individuals within the NSC might
wear "dual hats," in that they might also directly advise the President separate
from their NSC duties, a small portion of records that might be held within the
NSC could constitute presidential records.92 The Supreme Court recognized
this limited exception in Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, in which the Court determined that records of telephone conversations of
Henry Kissinger while he served as National Security Adviser were not subject
to the FOIA because the records were created while Kissinger was acting solely
in his capacity as a Presidential adviser.93 The Supreme Court traced this
limited exception back to other language in the legislative history of the 1974
FOIA that indicated that Congress did not intend to include within the
definition of "agency" the "President's immediate personal staff or units within
the Executive Office [of the President] whose sole function is to advise and
86. Several NSC records schedules from the period during which the NSC was
complying with the FRA are available on the National Archives website. Records Control Schedules,
NAT'L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/rcs/schedules/index.html?dir-/executive-offic
e-of-the-president/rg-0273 (last visited Apr. 30, 2014).
87. See Federal Records Guide, Records of the National Security Council, Record
Group 273, NAT'L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/273.html
(last visited Apr. 30, 2014).
88. Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-
2207).
89. Id § 2201(2)(B). The legislative history of the PRA also indicates that Congress did
not intend the PRA to alter the status of any agency, noting that any agency that "is now subject to FOIA
would remain so." H.R. REP. No. 95-1487, at 11 (1978).
90. Memorandum of John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to Counsel to the President, Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552) - National Security
Council - Agency Status Under FOIA, 2 Op. O.L.C. 197, 200 (Sept. 6, 1978) [hereinafter Harmon
Memo].
91. Id. at 197.
92. See, e.g., Willens v. Nat'l Sec. Council, 726 F. Supp. 325, 325 (D.D.C. 1989)
(distinguishing between NSC "institutional files" and "presidential files" in NSC custody).
93. 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980).
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assist the President." 94 While recognizing this limited exception, the Supreme
Court nevertheless expressly excluded the NSC from it, distinguishing the
Kissinger documents, to which the FOIA did not apply, from records of the
NSC, which, the Court stated, was "an agency to which the FOIA does
apply." 95
The legislative history of the FOIA examined in Kissinger further
indicates that Congress intended the exception for entities whose "sole
function" is to "advise and assist" the President to be exceedingly narrow. In
particular, the conference report indicated that, for entities within the Executive
Office of the President, Congress intended the "result reached" in Soucie v.
David,96 in which the D.C. Circuit held that the White House Office of Science
and Technology (OST) was an "agency." 97 The Soucie court's holding was
premised on the existence of a single function of the OST-"to evaluate the
scientific research programs of the various federal agencies"-that extended
beyond its primary function of advising the President on science and
technology policy.98 On this basis, the Soucie court found that the OST's "sole
function" was not to advise and assist the President. 99 In finding that the NSC
was similarly an agency under the FOIA, the 1978 OLC opinion specifically
held that the NSC satisfied the Soucie "sole function" standard.100
The NSC's compliance with the FRA and the FOIA, however, ended
abruptly in the early 1990s when the executive branch unilaterally changed its
polices and began categorically treating all NSC records as presidential records.
C. NSC Records: 1993-Present
In 1989, journalist Scott Armstrong and other plaintiffs filed suit in
Washington, D.C. seeking to prevent the possible destruction of certain records,
including records of the NSC, at the conclusion of the Reagan administration.
94. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, at 14 (1974) (Conf. Rep.)). A similar
distinction was institutionalized within NSC recordkeeping. A former Director of the NSC's Office of
Policy and Security Review, for example, noted that NSC documents were "handled on a two-track"
system for FOIA purposes. Dep't of Justice, FOIA Focus: Brenda S. Reger, FOIA UPDATE, Vol. VI, No.
1 (1985), http://www.justice.gov/oip/foiaupdates/Vol VI_1/page5.htm. The former Director stated that
when the NSC functioned "as White House staff," the "documents generated are presidential records
and are eventually placed in the appropriate presidential library," but that when the NSC staff were
"included in formulating or implementing NSC directives, the documents generated" were "agency
records subject to the FOIA." Id.
95. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 146 (1980).
96. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
97. H.R. REP. No. 93-1380 (1974) (Conf. Rep.).
98. Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1073-74. Soucie applied the older Administrative Procedures
Act definition of "agency." See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012) (defining agency as "each authority of the
Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency").
99. Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1076.
100. See Harmon Memo, supra note 90, at 204 (finding that NSC committees
empowered by the President via Executive Order "to act without Presidential participation" were
sufficient to "prevent the NSC from being viewed as solely advisory").
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During the Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President litigation, both the
district court and D.C. Circuit issued early opinions in the case that were
premised on the then-unchallenged conclusion that the NSC was an agency
subject to both the FOIA and the FRA.'0 The last of these opinions was a 1993
decision of the D.C. Circuit that upheld the District Court's finding in
Armstrong that the NSC's recordkeeping practices failed to adequately comply
with the FRA.102
The turning point in Armstrong began with another 1993 D.C. Circuit
decision, Meyer v. Bush, in which a divided panel changed the interpretation of
the meaning of "agency" under the FOIA in holding that a Presidential Task
Force within the Executive Office of the President was not an agency. o3
Instead of applying the plain language of the FOIA, which expressly includes
establishments in the Executive Office of the President within the term
"agency," or the limited exception represented by the Soucie "sole function"
test, the Meyer court created a new, three-part test.' The Meyer test for
determining whether an entity within the Executive Office of the President is an
"agency" weighs factors such as whether the entity has a "self-contained
structure," its operational proximity to the President, and an assessment of the
powers delegated to the entity by the President. os A sharp dissent in Meyer
stated that two parts of the new test were "entirely creatures of the majority's
own making" and that the test significantly limited the entities within the
Executive Office of the President that could count as agencies, contrary to the
text of the FOIA. 106
Following Meyer, the legal adviser to the NSC quietly requested that the
OLC revisit the question of whether the NSC was an agency subject to the
FOIA. On September 20, 1993, the OLC changed course from its 1978 opinion,
and held that, upon "reconsideration of this issue in light of the recent court of
appeals decision and our understanding of the current functions of the NSC, we
conclude that the NSC is not an agency for FOIA purposes."10 7
In reversing its opinion, the OLC expressly noted the substantial change in
the interpretation of the FOIA that Meyer had brought about. While the 1978
OLC opinion had held, for example, that the "legislative history of FOIA
necessitates a very narrow interpretation of the term 'assist' in the phrase
101. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, I F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(affirming lower court's finding that NSC electronic records were subject to the Federal Records Act);
Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 810 F. Supp. 335 (D.D.C. 1993) (finding NSC violations of
the Federal Records Act).
102. Armstrong, I F.3d. 1274.
103. 981 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
104. Id. at 1293.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1312 (Wald, J., dissenting).
107. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to Alan J. Kreczko, Special Assistant to the President and Legal Adviser, Nat'l Sec.
Council, Re: Status of NSC as an "Agency" Under FOIA (Sept. 20, 1993) [hereinafter Dellinger Memo].
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"entities whose sole function is to advise or assist the President," the 1993 OLC
opinion stated that Meyer had given "the term a much broader meaning." And,
therefore, NSC functions that the 1978 OLC opinion had held were "important,
substantial and far-reaching governmental functions" illustrating that the NSC
did much more than "advise and assist the President" were transformed, post-
Meyer, into merely "assisting" the President.
Shortly thereafter in the Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President
litigation, the executive asserted for the first time in early 1994 that the NSC
was not an agency and was subject to neither the FOIA nor the FRA.' 08 District
Court Judge Charles R. Richey, in a lengthy February 1995 opinion in
Armstrong, rejected the government's arguments that the NSC was not an
agency. Judge Richey, scarcely concealing his incredulity, began:
Despite a long history of acting as an "agency," and after admitting it was an
agency, and thus subject to the Federal Records Act in this litigation, and
notwithstanding a long practice of processing records pursuant to the Freedom
of Information Act, the President and the Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council suddenly changed course in 1994 declaring that the National
Security Council is not an agency and thus not subject to the Federal Records
Act. 109
Judge Richey rejected the Executive's assertions and added the further
criticism that the government's "sudden change in position" regarding the
status of the NSC was "not only contrary to law but without any reasoned
explanation." 10
The government appealed. On August 2, 1996, a divided panel of the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Meyer three-factor test, reversed the
District Court, and held that the NSC was exempt from both the FRA and the
FOIA on the basis that the NSC was not an agency. 1
Writing for the majority, Judge Douglas Ginsburg concluded that,
although the NSC had a "self-contained" structure, satisfying the first prong of
the Meyer test,1 2 the other two Meyer factors precluded the NSC from being an
"agency." First, the Armstrong majority held that not only was the NSC
"operationally proximate" to the President under the second Meyer prong, but
also that the NSC's proximity should heighten the court's scrutiny of any
"functions" of the NSC beyond advising the President, under the third Meyer
108. Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 877 F. Supp. 690, 694 (D.D.C. 1995).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 697.
111. Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
112. Id. at 559-60 (noting that the NSC staff is a "professional corps" with a significant
number of employees and is "organized into a complex system of committees and working groups . ..
[with] separate offices . . . with clearly established lines of authority both among and within the
offices").
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factor. 113 The finding of "proximity" therefore had the effect of fundamentally
altering the Soucie "sole function" standard endorsed in the FOIA's legislative
history by placing a thumb on the scale in favor of finding that an entity is not
an agency.
The Armstrong majority further departed from the plain language and
legislative history of the FOIA when it rejected an extensive list of NSC
functions and authorities delegated by Congress or the President that extended
beyond advising the President.1 14 The authorities included NSC functions in the
areas of intelligence, protection of national security information,
telecommunications policy, emergency preparedness, non-proliferation, and
public diplomacy."1 5 In rejecting each NSC authority, the Armstrong majority
employed a nearly insurmountable standard that required the plaintiff to show
not only that the NSC was empowered to exercise a given authority "without
the consent of the President," but also that the NSC, as a factual matter, had
actually exercised it. 116
After acknowledging that the President had "delegated to the NSC some
authority over emergency preparedness and crisis management," for example,
and that the President had instructed "all departments and agencies with
responsibility for national defense preparedness to adhere to NSC 'policy and
guidelines' in that area," the Armstrong majority nevertheless accepted the
NSC's argument that it was merely "providing advice and assistance to the
President."1 17 In response to the plaintiffs argument that the NSC's role in this
area was further established by a presidential directive that authorized the NSC
to "oversee the implementation of the goals and principles" in emergency
planning, the Armstrong majority stated that the plaintiff was unable to provide
evidence that the NSC had provided such oversight and found that this NSC
function was not "sufficiently distinct from advising and assisting the
President." 18
Finally, the Armstrong majority found that the NSC's past conduct,
statements, and compliance with the FOIA and the FRA were "not probative on
the question before the court-whether the NSC is indeed an agency within the
113. See id. at 560 (stating that due to NSC's proximity, plaintiffs "must make a strong
showing indeed" of non-advisory NSC functions); id. at 567 (stating that, in order to win, plaintiffs'
showing of independent authority must be "compelling").
114. Id. at 560-66.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 563 (stating that plaintiff had not "established that any of this authority can
be exercised without the consent of the President"); id. at 562 (noting that the court is reluctant to place
substantial weight on "the mere formality of a delegation of authority"). As the OLC acknowledged in
its 1993 opinion, this is a departure from the Soucie "sole function" test in which the relevant issue is the
"authority to act." Dellinger Memo, supra note 107, at 7 (noting that the "Soucie test focuses on the
authority to act" while the Meyer test "stressed the actual actions of [the] entity in question").
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meaning of the FOIA"-noting, "quite simply, the Government's position on
that question has changed over the years."" 9
Judge David S. Tatel issued a sharply worded dissent stressing that the
NSC had "complied with FOIA during the administrations of Presidents Ford,
Carter, Reagan, and Bush" and had "declared itself exempt from FOIA only
recently while this litigation was pending." In his view, "the record
demonstrates that the NSC exercises . . . just the sorts of independent authority
that our cases hold satisfy the requirements of the FOIA definition of
'agency.""
20
Judge Tatel also stressed that while the President is a member of and
receives advice from the NSC, the NSC nevertheless is "a legal entity distinct
from the President, and the record indicates that responsibilities delegated to
the NSC are in fact carried out without the personal involvement of the
President."'21
Finally, Judge Tatel criticized the majority for expanding the limited
exclusion from the FOIA and the FRA for specific records created by
individuals when they "advise and assist the President": "A host of executive
branch activities that Congress subjected to FOIA can also be viewed as
activities that 'assist the President,' for surely the President is assisted in
executing the laws by every delegation of power he makes." 22 Judge Tatel
argued that the D.C. Circuit previously asserted that it "must not allow the
'advise and assist' exception to swallow the FOIA rule" but concluded that
"[t]hat is exactly what I fear the court has done today."l23
On the basis of the D.C. Circuit's 1996 Armstrong decision, in June 1998
the NSC removed its regulations for processing FOIA requests.124 The White
House website currently lists the NSC among entities within the Executive
Office of the President that are "exempt from the provisions of the FOIA."l 25
III. Documentation and Accountability for Drone Killings
On the basis of this history, the NSC's significant involvement in
substantive targeting determinations results in less stringent legal obligations to
document precisely the activity for which documentation requirements ought to
be the most exacting: the act of killing without judicial process, be it of a U.S.
119. Id. at 566.
120. Id. at 567 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 568-69.
122. Id. at 569.
123. Id.
124. Freedom of Information Act Requests for Classified Documents, 63 Fed. Reg.
25,736 (May 8, 1998) (removing NSC regulations for processing FOIA requests on the basis that "NSC
records are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act" and that removal was
"consistent" with D.C. Circuit's holding in Armstrong).
125. Office ofAdministration-FOIA, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/admi
nistration/eop/oa/foia (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
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citizen or of a citizen of another nation, far from a "hot" battlefield, in a
country that is not at war with the United States. The current situation severely
compromises the possibility of present and future accountability and
transparency, while impairing both government decision-making and public
debate. Such consequences also carry larger implications for the expansion of
executive power.
A. Killing Outside ofRecognized Battlefields Requires Documentation
Current policy regarding U.S. government killings outside of recognized
battlefields demands stricter documentation requirements. As described above,
the government's current procedures for selecting individuals for drone killings
appear to consist of a "funnel" in which agencies first provide lists of
individuals along with intelligence information about them.126 Those lists are
eventually submitted to "a panel of National Security Council officials" that
assess and debate the intelligence in light of the relevant, self-selected legal
standards and ultimately determine which individuals should be targeted for
lethal action.127
The government's current exclusion of the NSC from the requirements of
the FRA and the FOIA means that while the lower-level agency "inputs"
regarding individuals considered for possible targeting remain subject to the
FRA and the FOIA, the higher-level, substantive deliberations about those
elements within the NSC and the ensuing targeting decisions are not. The
nature of NSC deliberations and determinations highlights the compelling need
for adequate documentation.128
First, the stakes involved are nothing short of existential. As Attorney
General Eric Holder noted in his March 2012 speech on targeting U.S. persons,
an "individual's interest in making sure that the government does not target him
erroneously could not be more significant."I 29 The legal requirements for
documenting such an extraordinary decision ought, therefore, to be heightened.
Other government decisions of analogous gravity are extensively documented.
126. Miller, supra note 45.
127. The extent to which this culled list or part of it is provided to the President for his
final approval remains unclear. Hosenball, supra note II (stating that the NSC "kill" panel "informs the
president of its decisions" and that the "role of the president in ordering or ratifying a decision to target a
citizen is fuzzy"); Miller, supra note 45. According to a former official, "one of the reasons for making
senior [NSC] officials principally responsible for nominating Americans for the target list was to
'protect' the president." Hosenball, supra note I1.
128. Our focus on record-keeping should not suggest that the Executive's killing
program does not bring up serious legal issues. The various constitutional and international legal issues
implicated by this use of drones have been well reported. See, e.g., Philip Alston, The CIA and Targeted
Killings Beyond Borders, 2 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 283 (2011); Milena Sterio, The United States' Use of
Drones in the War on Terror: The (II)legality of Targeted Killings Under International Law, 45 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 197, 209-12 (2012) (arguing that the administration's use of drones likely violates
the law of armed conflict).
129. Holder Northwestern Speech, supra note 13.
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Compare, for example, the documentation of criminal trials that result in the
imposition of capital punishment or extended criminal sentences, which include
court-reported transcripts for even routine proceedings.
Second, the targeting process that culminates in NSC decision-making is
non-adversarial. The government's determinations include no independent
advocates for individuals being considered for lethal targeting-advocates who
would test and challenge the "evidence" upon which determinations are
based. 130 This increases the need for greater documentation of the deliberations
to lay a necessary foundation for any post hoc reviews undertaken to change or
discontinue the program, redress erroneous strikes by awarding damages, or
inform future policymaking.
Third, the legality of drone killings under both U.S. and international law
remains questionable, further underscoring the need for thorough
documentation. Whether the unilateral killing of a U.S. citizen outside a zone
of hostilities complies with the due process requirements of the U.S.
Constitution and with various federal statutes remains an unresolved
question.131 Similar questions abound regarding the program's conformity with
international human rights and humanitarian law.1 32
Indeed, any killings outside of recognized battlefields raise such serious
questions. The gravity of these concerns is only compounded when the state
130. While proposals for a so-called "drone court" that would "authorize" drone strikes
in advance raise a number of concerns beyond the scope of this Article, were such courts to utilize
traditional court reporting, they would offer the ancillary benefit of providing more detailed
documentation. See, e.g., Greg Miller, Lawmakers Propose Giving Federal Judges Role in Drone
Strikes, but Hurdles Await, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national
-security/proposal-to-give-federal-judges-a-role-in-drone-strikes-faces-hurdles/2013/02/08/66f53508-72
la-I le2-8b8d-eOb59alb8e2a story.html; Jeh C. Johnson, Keynote Address at the Center on National
Security at Fordham Law School: A "Drone Court": Some Pros and Cons (Mar. 18, 2013),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/jeh-johnson-speech-on-a-drone-court-some-pros-and-cons; Steve
Vladeck, Why a "Drone Court" Won't Work-But (Nominal) Damages Might, LAWFARE (Feb. 10,
2013, 5:12 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/why-a-drone-court-wont-work.
131. See Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 12-1192, 2014 WL 1352452, at *12 (D.D.C. Apr. 4,
2014) (finding that plaintiff asserted "a 'plausible' procedural and substantive due process claim on
behalf of Anwar Al-Aulaqi"); New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 515-
16 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (stating that the targeted killings of U.S. citizens seem "on [their] face incompatible
with our Constitution and laws"), aff'din part, rev'd in part, 2014 WL 1569514 (2d Cir. Apr. 21, 2014).
John Brennan's 2013 C.I.A. confirmation hearing, for example, was replete with issues relating to the
legality of drone strikes. Open Hearing on the Nomination of John 0. Brennan To Be Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency: A Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong. (2013),
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130207/transcript.pdf; see also Richard Murphy & Afsheen John
Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 405 (2009) (arguing that
"American due process principles should control targeted killing of suspected terrorists"); Benjamin
McKelvey, Note, Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: The
Unconstitutional Scope of Executive Killing Power, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1353 (2011) (arguing
that "the constitutionality of targeted killing is highly suspect").
132. See generally Alston, supra note 128 (arguing that from the "perspective" of
international law "the practice of secret killings conducted outside conventional combat settings" is a
"deeply disturbing and regressive one"); Amos N. Guiora, Targeted Killing: When Proportionality Gets
All Out ofProportion, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LAw 235 (2012) (assessing drone killings in the context
of law of armed conflict principles such as proportionality and distinction); Sterio, supra note 128, at
209-12 (asserting that "most targeted killings are illegal under international law").
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actor resorts to so-called "signature strikes" and other approaches that appear to
defy the fundamental principles of necessity, proportionality, and distinction
and undermine any representation that such strikes are "targeted."' 33 Although
there is great variation in the reported percentage of drone victims that are non-
U.S. citizen civilians, 134 the very possibility that large numbers of civilians have
been killed outside of active zones of hostilities in Pakistan, Yemen, and
Somalia only adds moral urgency to these questions and reveals another
problematic dimension that limited documentation creates.
Fourth, more rigorous documentation would not create an undue burden
on the executive branch. The current targeting process that involves NSC
assessments and determinations based upon information about individuals
provided by multiple agencies already appears to be, by its nature, highly fact-
and record-intensive, lending itself to documentation.135 For instance, the
determination that a targeted individual "is a senior operational leader of al-
Qa'ida or an associated force" itself likely requires a complex and fact-bound
136analysis. The process also purportedly includes a determination "after a
thorough and careful review" that "the individual poses an imminent threat of
violent attack against the United States," that "capture is not feasible," and that
the lethal force will comply with law of war principles including necessity,
distinction, and proportionality.1 37 The description of this "thorough" review, if
accurate, highlights the substantive and fact-based determinations required in
NSC deliberations.' The extra step of documenting these deliberations in
keeping with the FRA would not require a great deal of additional resources.
Indeed, such deliberations occur not on a battlefield, but in the controlled
confines of a government office building, sometimes over secure
videoconference, which could easily be recorded and stored.
Moreover, enhanced documentation of such deliberations should not
create additional security concerns. While the FRA fully accounts for the
133. See Klaidman, supra note 37.
134. For an analysis of, and citations to, several studies of civilian casualties and an
analysis of their various conclusions, see Ritika Singh, A Meta-Study of Drone Strike Casualties,
LAWFARE (July 22, 2013, 4:35 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/07/a-meta-study-of-drone-strike
-casualties. The administration has contended that the actual number of civilian casualties is minimal
and that every effort is taken to reduce civilian casualties. See President Obama's May 2013 NDU
Speech, supra note I ("[Blefore any strike is taken, there must be near certainty that no civilians will be
killed or injured .... ); see also Holder Northwestern Speech, supra note 13 (stating that using drones
"may help to ensure" that "the risk of civilian casualties can be minimized or avoided altogether").
135. Holder Northwestern Speech, supra note 13.
136. DOJ White Paper, supra note 12, at 1.
137. Holder Northwestern Speech, supra note 13. The current procedure already forces
the NSC to analyze data culled from multiple sources. Miller, supra note 45.
138. Although administration officials admit that drone killings have been used outside
of recognized battlefields, they consistently aver that the killings target persons who are part of
organizations that are at war with the United States. This definition of war, however, strains the
traditional definition. See Holder Northwestern Speech, supra note 13 ("Our legal authority is not
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necessity for the emergency destruction of records outside the United States
when, for example, "hostile action by a foreign power appears imminent,",139
the records of NSC deliberations that may take place within the White House
Situation Room do not present such dangers.
Even if all records are kept in classified form, robust and clear
documentation requirements will at least preserve the possibility of
accountability down the line. That possibility, however remote in time,
becomes especially important when the U.S. government is acting outside of
recognized battlegrounds to take the lives of its own citizens and those of
citizens of countries that are not at war with the United States.140 The domestic
rule of law and constitutional concerns could not be more significant and the
foreign relations implications more deep and vast, with potential implications
for future international conflicts.
Finally, the need for more extensive legal requirements for documentation
is made greater by the fact that there are significant disincentives to document
this activity. The characteristics of the current process create an incentive for
formal and informal policies that attempt to limit the "record," whether by
deliberately not creating records or by limiting those that are retained.141 This
concern is far from theoretical. A study funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts in
2000 concerning former White House Counsels, for example, found that the
fear of subpoenas and the perceived inadequacies of presidential privileges had
led to "no notes" policies within the White House. Abner Mikva, a former
federal judge and White House counsel in the Clinton administration, for
instance, stated in an interview that "[wie just never put anything in writing. At
least I did[n't]. All the habits I learned as a good litigator where I took detailed
notes about what was going on I threw out the window."l42 Even more bluntly,
in speaking about his tenure as Chief of Staff in President Gerald Ford's White
House, former Vice President Dick Cheney said that he "learned early on that if
you don't want your memos to get you in trouble some day, just don't write
any."l43
Because the executive does not treat the NSC as a federal agency, the
incentive not to create documentation is not counter-balanced by the FRA's
139. 44 U.S.C. § 3311 (2012).
140. For example, administration officials have noted that the way the United States
carries out its drone killing program will constitute an example for the international community. Holder
Northwestern Speech, supra note 13 (stating that the "Administration will remain true" to the values of
"security, justice and liberty" that have made the United States "a beacon of justice for all the world").
141. See, e.g., Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(noting that government entities "have a built-in incentive to dispose of records relating to 'mistakes').
142. MaryAnne Borrelli et al., The White House Counsel's Office, THE WHITE HOUSE
2001 PROJECT 32 (2000), http://www.whitehousetransitionproject.org/files/counsel/Counsel-OD.PDF.
Charles Ruff, a successor to Mikva, stated: "We did not take notes. We were subject to subpoena.
People were very careful not to put things down in writing." Id.
143. Meredith Fuchs, The White House: Off Limits to Historians?, AM. CONSTITUTION
Soc'Y 2 (2008), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Fuchs%201ssue%20Brief.pdf.
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requirement that agencies "shall make and preserve records" to "furnish the
information necessary to protect the legal . . . rights of . . . persons directly
affected by the agency's activities."' The U.S. government's current killing
policy outside of recognized battlefields therefore demands robust
documentation.
B. The Fallout from Limited Documentation
The current limited documentation requirements undermine the ability to
assess, evaluate, and, where appropriate, hold accountable the U.S. government
for its decisions to use drone killings. Regardless of the merit of various
proposals to ensure proper oversight, the lack of meaningful documentation
obligations severely hampers the roles of both the courts and Congress and
risks a dangerous expansion of presidential power.
In relation to the courts, the current limited obligation to create and
preserve documentation of NSC activities undermines the adequacy of the
record. Although the Executive argues that any due process entitlements that
targeted U.S. citizens may have are addressed by the unilateral, non-judicial
process afforded in internal executive branch deliberations, this position has yet
to be tested in court. Should courts ultimately disagree with the Executive's
proposition as a matter of constitutional law, it is unclear that they would have
an appropriate evidentiary record upon which to proceed.
Courts adjudicating wrongful death suits by family members of citizens or
others killed through the drone killing program, for example, might need to
review records of targeting determinations-even if under classified seal or ex
parte and in camera-in order to properly perform their function. A lawsuit
filed by the father of Anwar al-Awlaqi (and grandfather of Abdulrahman al-
Awlaqi) against senior U.S. officials seeking "monetary damages for violating
the rights of the deceased under the U.S. Constitution" based on the drone
killings of Anwar and Abdulrahman in 2010, provides an illustration.145 While
the U.S. government has now officially acknowledged killing both
individuals, 146 the circumstances surrounding the approval of the strike that
killed Abdulrahman, a sixteen-year-old U.S. citizen, whose death U.S. officials
have unofficially admitted was an "outrageous mistake," are unclear, and
whether records exist that document that decision is uncertain. 147
144. 44 U.S.C. § 3101 (2012).
145. Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 12-1192, 2014 WL 1352452, at *6 (D.D.C. Apr. 4,
2014). Despite finding that the complaint stated "a 'plausible' procedural and substantive due process
claim on behalf of Anwar al-Aulaqi" the court held that there was "no available remedy under U.S.
law." Id. at * 12.
146. Holder May 2013 Letter, supra note 28, at 2 (officially acknowledging that the
United States "specifically targeted and killed" Anwar al-Awlaqi and killed Abdulrahman al-Awlaqi
although he was "not specifically targeted").
147. See DeYoung, supra note 46 (quoting a senior U.S. official stating that killing of
Abdulrahman was "an outrageous mistake"); Jeremy Scahill, Inside America s Dirty Wars, NATION,
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Admittedly, the availability of judicial recourse in this arena has thus far
been extremely limited. In 2010, for example, the father of Anwar al-Awlaqi
filed a pre-strike lawsuit that sought an injunction prohibiting the U.S.
government from intentionally killing al-Awlaqi "unless he presents a concrete,
specific, and imminent threat to life or physical safety, and there are no means
other than lethal force that could reasonably be employed to neutralize the
threat."1 48 The court, while acknowledging that the issues raised in the case
were "extraordinary" and "stark" nevertheless held that al-Awlaqi's father
lacked standing and that the "political question" doctrine barred judicial
intervention in the case and therefore the court never reached the substance of
the case.149
Similarly, in a hearing on a motion to dismiss the al-Awlaqi wrongful
death suit, the court strongly questioned the government's assertions that there
is no role for the judiciary in assessing targeted killings.'50 The court
nevertheless subsequently dismissed the case finding that there was "no
available remedy under U.S. law."' 5 '
Despite such unfavorable precedents, judicial oversight and the related
need for an adequate record remain relevant. The Second Circuit recently held,
for example, that the government must disclose certain records related to drone
killings under the FOIA, even if in redacted form. 152 The district court had
previously dismissed the FOIA lawsuit, concluding that it could "find no way
around the thicket of laws and precedents" leading to the conclusion that the
"[g]overnment has not violated FOIA" by refusing to disclose the requested
records, even while noting that drone killings "seem on their face incompatible
with our Constitution and laws."' 53 On appeal, however, the Second Circuit
reversed, in part, finding that the FOIA required disclosure of a legal
memorandum on targeted killing. 154
May 13, 2013, http://www.thenation.com/article/l73980/inside-americas-dirty-wars (citing former
Obama administration official stating that the killing of Abdulrahman al-Awlaqi "was a mistake, a bad
mistake" and quoting NSC spokeswoman refusing to respond stating she "won't go into our internal
deliberations").
148. Al-Aulaqi v. Obarna, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting plaintiffs
complaint).
149. See id. The government also asserted a military and state secrets privilege, but the
court avoided reaching the issue by dismissing the case on other grounds. Id. at 54.
150. See Scott Shane, Judge Challenges White House Claims on Authority in Drone
Killings, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2013, at A8 (reporting that the court questioned government lawyers
about the limit on targeting of U.S. citizens and that the court provided its own answer: "[t]he limit is the
courthouse door").
151. Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 12-1192, 2014 WL 1352452, at *12 (D.D.C. Apr. 4,
2014).
152. New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 13-422, 2014 WL 1569514, at
*1 (2dCir. Apr. 21, 2014).
153. New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 515-16
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
154. New York Times Co., 2014 WL 1569514, at *1.
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The Second Circuit decision powerfully illustrates how the FOIA can
limit overbroad assertions that records cannot be disclosed by requiring the
identification of any "reasonably segregable" information in any given
record.155 And while the judicial review provided under the FOIA is often
deferential to agency determinations, it nevertheless can constitute a
meaningful independent check. Thus, the FOIA offers an established, if
imperfect or limited, structure for balancing security imperatives with the need
for transparency.
That said, it is the very reality of limited court oversight that makes
documentation and record-keeping all the more critical as they are a sine qua
non of reliable policy reform and historical accountability. In evaluating
whether to impose statutory limits on the drone killing program or to enact
specific oversight mechanisms, for example, Congress would need to access
documentation on targeting determinations, to the extent possible.157
Even within the executive branch, future assessments of whether to
continue the program or to take remedial actions in its wake would benefit from
the imposition of robust record-keeping requirements. Especially in the case of
possible targeting "errors," it would be crucial to be able to review a fully
developed "record" to identify, for example, dissenting views that were
overlooked or not fully considered or intelligence reports on which too much
reliance was placed. Moreover, the success of any after-the-fact assessments of
drone killings, even if confined to the executive branch, would depend on the
existence of a reliable and fairly comprehensive documentary record.158
155. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012) ("Any reasonably segregable portion of a record
shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt
under the subsection."). Of course, the value of small portions of releasable information in disparate
records can itself provide further justification for the government withholding information under the
"mosaic theory." See generally David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the
Freedom ofInformation Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628 (2005).
156. In another case involving a different entity within the Executive Office of the
President, a district court ordered the disclosure of a record the government argued was classified and
exempt under the FOIA. Ctr. for Int'l Envtl. Law v. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., 845 F. Supp. 2d 252
(D.D.C. 2012). The district court was, however, reversed on appeal. Ctr. for Int'l Envtl. Law v. Office of
the U.S. Trade Rep., 718 F.3d 899 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
157. While Senator Dianne Feinstein has asserted that the Senate Intelligence
Committee exercises "robust" oversight of the drone killing program including reviewing "strike records
(including video footage)" it remains unclear the extent of these records and whether they adequately
document the reality of the deliberations that lie behind the drone killing determinations. See Press
Release, Feinstein Statement on Intelligence Committee Oversight of Targeted Killings (Feb. 13, 2013),
http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=5b8dbeOc-07b6-4714-b663-bOlc7c
9b99b8. In fact, the asserted oversight of the drone killing program is undermined by the same press
release in which Feinstein notes that the executive branch continued to withhold relevant records related
to the legal justifications upon which the targeted killing determinations were based. Id.
158. See, e.g., Afsheen John Radsan & Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot Once:
Higher Care for CIA-Targeted Killing, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1201, 1207 (arguing that there should be a
"heightened standard of certainty" for drone targeting and that each killing "should receive an
independent review that is as public as national security permits" as well as a "'hard look' review" by an
inspector general to ensure that targeted killings "occur only after careful, reasoned consideration of all
reasonably available and relevant information").
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The Executive's asserted categorical exemption of NSC records from the
FOIA also significantly impacts the larger, contemporary public debate on such
weighty matters. Even in dismissing a FOIA lawsuit for certain records related
to targeted killing, for example, a court noted that the disclosure of the
requested records would have allowed "for intelligent discussion and
assessment of a tactic that (like torture before it) remains hotly debated." 59
While many, if not most, of the NSC records relating to targeted killing may be
exempt under FOIA,160 recent FOIA cases, including the ACLU's highly
successful "Torture FOIA" lawsuit against the Department of Defense and
several other agencies in the Southern District of New York, illustrate how a
small selection of documents and government Vaughn declarations describing
withheld documents (to the extent that the public record allows) can inform
public debate and lead to policy changes.161
Taking a longer view, limited documentation seriously undermines
historical accountability. Future researchers will lack the ability to critically
examine the government's present claims if sufficient documentation is not
created and preserved. The lack of fulsome records will frustrate the efforts of
future historians studying this extraordinary period in U.S. history, when senior
government officials were involved in designating individuals for lethal
targeting.
Application of the dual regimes of the FRA and the FOIA that previously
governed the NSC for almost two decades would go a long way towards
addressing concerns relating to documentation and transparency. With respect
to documentation, the FRA would heighten the requirement to create
documentation that could provide, at the very least, an adequate historical
record. Moreover, the FRA's restrictions on the destruction of records, which
requires the approval of the Archivist of the United States and is subject to
judicial review, would help ensure that records holding continuing value would
be preserved.
The current lack of such documentation and disclosure requirements
creates risk of expanded presidential power. The broadening of presidential
discretion over both what documentation is created as well as what is destroyed
159. New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 515 (S.D.N.Y.
2013). The Second Circuit recently reversed, in part, this decision. New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't
of Justice, No. 13-422, 2014 WL 1569514 (Apr. 21, 2014).
160. See Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(Tatel, J., dissenting) (describing the FOIA exemptions relevant to NSC records).
161. See ACLU v. Dep't of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); JACK
GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT 115-17 (2012) (discussing the value of Vaughn declarations in
the ACLU v. DOD FOIA case, which "forced the CIA to explain what it refused to produce"). "The
Vaughns are often as important as the documents themselves because they can reveal the existence of
previously unknown documents (and thus, sometimes, of unknown activities)." Id. at 116-17 (quoting
Jameel Jaffer of the ACLU); see also Jack Goldsmith, Drone Stories, the Secrecy System, and Public
Accountability, LAWFARE (May 31, 2012, 8:03 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/05/drone-storie
s-the-secrecy-system-and-public-accountability (stating that Vaughn declarations can "by themselves
provide important information" and "can be the basis for further disclosures").
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or preserved allows presidents greater flexibility of action and an expansion of
"presidential deniability," while narrowly limiting any outside scrutiny and
oversight, whether in the present or future.162 The long, and often infamous,
history of the NSC illustrates the gravity of the risks to historical accountability
for presidential actions posed by both inadequate documentation and records
destruction. Whether President Eisenhower ordered the assassination of a
foreign leader during an NSC meeting, for example, was intentionally omitted
from NSC minutes,163 while NSC records potentially illustrating more
extensive knowledge on the part of President Reagan of the Iran-Contra affair
were famously destroyed.'6 By excluding the NSC from both the FOIA and
the FRA, the D.C. Circuit's decision in Armstrong essentially institutionalized
the President's ability to avoid accountability.
IV. Recommendations for NSC Documentary Accountability
The consequences flowing from the NSC's central role in drone killing
determinations provide a compelling, and urgent, argument for revisiting the
U.S. government's treatment of the NSC as exempt from both the FRA and the
FOIA. Possible solutions could come from the courts, Congress, or the
executive branch.
A. Revisiting Judicial Treatment ofNSC
The first possible remedy would be for courts to revisit the D.C. Circuit's
exclusion of the NSC from the FOIA and the FRA in Armstrong.l1s By
reaffirming the NSC's obligation to comply with tjhe FRA and the FOIA, the
courts could not only restore recordkeeping, preservation, and disclosure
obligations, but also ensure judicial oversight of the NSC's compliance with
those requirements. This is especially significant in the context of drone
killings over which the judiciary has thus far exercised limited oversight.167
162. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, It Came From Beneath the Twilight Zone: Wiretapping
and Article II Imperialism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1420 (2010) (discussing examples of record
destruction for the purposes of creating deniability for the President).
163. See Athan G. Theoharis, In-House Cover-up: Researching FBI Files, in BEYOND
THE HIss CASE: THE FBI, CONGRESS AND THE COLD WAR 20, 41 (Athan G. Theoharis ed., 1982)
(surveying historical Congressional testimony indicating the "intentional incompleteness of NSC
minutes" and discussing President Dwight Eisenhower's order to assassinate Congolese leader Patrice
Lumumba).
164. See, e.g., Linda P. Campbell, North: Poindexter Destroyed Paper, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 13, 1990, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1990-03-13/news/9001210334_1 iran-contra-poindext
er-district-judge-harold-greene ("Oliver North said Monday he watched former National Security
Adviser John Poindexter destroy a politically damaging document signed by then-President Ronald
Reagan.").
165. See Armstrong, 90 F.3d 553.
166. See discussion supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 12-1192, 2014 WL 1352452 (D.D.C. Apr. 4,
2014) (dismissing wrongful death lawsuit seeking damages on behalf of the estates of individuals killed
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Judicial authority even over the limited area of enforcing FOIA obligations
could also result in more transparency that could further inform public debate
over drone killings.
While Armstrong has become increasingly entrenched within the D.C.
Circuit,168 the decision has several shortcomings. First, as described above, the
Armstrong decision significantly departed from the plain language of the FOIA
statute, which unambiguously includes establishments in the Executive Office
of the President within the definition of "agency," and fundamentally altered
the "sole factor" test applied in Soucie, which was endorsed in the FOIA's
legislative history. 169
Further, the NSC's assertion that it is not an agency subject to the FOIA
has not been widely challenged outside of the D.C. Circuit.170 Courts
unencumbered by Armstrong may find the D.C. Circuit's analysis
unpersuasive, particularly given that Armstrong relied upon standards derived
from earlier precedent unique to the D.C. Circuit.171 The analysis in Armstrong
further distances the law of that circuit from the statutory language and relevant
Supreme Court precedent that would control in other circuits.172 If another
circuit were to conclude that Armstrong was wrongly decided, it could increase
the likelihood of the Supreme Court granting certiorari to revisit-and perhaps
reaffirm-its earlier precedent indicating that the NSC was subject to the
FOIA.173
Moreover, even in the context of D.C. Circuit jurisprudence, the analysis
in Armstrong is demonstrably outdated. The Armstrong majority's analysis
relied upon a detailed factual examination of NSC legal authorities delegated
by Congress or the President in order to determine whether the NSC was
exercising substantial independent authority. This analysis, however, was
in drone strikes); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing a lawsuit seeking
an injunction against the drone killing of the plaintiffs son); but see New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't
of Justice, No. 13-422, 2014 WL 1569514, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 21, 2014) (holding that the government
was required under the FOIA to disclose a legal memorandum justifying targeted killing).
168. See, e.g., Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Office of Admin.,
566 F.3d 219 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (relying upon Armstrong in holding that the Office of Administration
within the Executive Office of the President is not subject to the FOIA); Elec. Privacy Inform. Ctr. v.
Nat'l Sec. Agency, 795 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (relying on Armstrong in holding that the NSC
need not review records referred to the NSC by the National Security Agency following a FOIA
request).
169. See supra notes 103-111 and accompanying text.
170. The authors' challenge to Armstrong is currently pending in the Second Circuit.
171. See Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that a Presidential
Task Force did not constitute an agency under the FOIA and establishing a new three-part test for
agency status).
172. The statutory language is clear and the most relevant Supreme Court decision to
the issue cites language in the legislative history also suggesting that the NSC is subject to the FOIA.
Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980) (citing Congressional
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confined to the NSC authorities at the time of the August 1996 decision in
Armstrong. The scope of the NSC's authorities has changed materially since
then.
For example, two months after the Armstrong decision, Congress
amended the statutory authorities of the NSC by creating within the NSC the
Committee on Foreign Intelligence and the Committee on Transnational
Threats. Congress empowered these NSC entities with authorities that extend
far beyond merely advising and assisting the President. 174 In 2008, for example,
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found that the NSC's Committee
on Foreign Intelligence had authorized intelligence activities based on the NSC
Committee's "broad authority to identify intelligence needs, establish priorities
to meet those intelligence needs, and establish policies relating to the conduct
of intelligence activities of the United States 'including appropriate roles and
missions for the elements of the intelligence community and appropriate targets
of intelligence collection activities."' 75 The Senate Committee explicitly noted
that these independent NSC Committee authorities were "in addition to
'performing such other functions as the President may direct."'
1 76
The NSC's activities in recent years further illustrate expansions in
substantive authority that go beyond simply advising the President. For
example, according to declarations by senior administration officials, the NSC
created the Special Access Program governing the CIA's rendition, detention,
and interrogation program that involves the use of torture and other brutal
interrogation techniques.177 The NSC also currently supervises the High-Value
174. Moreover, given that the D.C. Circuit's analysis in Armstrong focused on the
NSC's independence from the President, it is particularly relevant that Congress created these
committees within the NSC in 1996 over the objection of the President. See Presidential Statement on
Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1813 (Oct. 11, 1996)
("Although I am signing this Act, I have concerns about the provisions in it that purport to direct the
creation of two new National Security Council (NSC) committees-a Committee on Foreign
Intelligence and a Committee on Transnational Threats.").
175. S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATING TO
IRAQ CONDUCTED BY THE POLICY COUNTERTERRORISM EVALUATION GROUP AND THE OFFICE OF
SPECIAL PLANS WITHIN THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, S. REP. NO.
110-346, at 9 (2008) (quoting section 101(h) of the National Security Act of 1947).
176. Id. (quoting National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. 80-253, § 101(b), 61 Stat. 495
(1947)) (emphasis added).
177. Director of the CIA Leon E. Panetta stated in a sworn declaration that
Officials of the National Security Council (NSC) determined that in light of the extraordinary
circumstances affecting the vital interests of the United States and the sensitivity of the
activities contemplated in the CIA terrorist detention and interrogation program it was
essential to limit access to the information in the program. NSC officials established a special
access program governing access to information relating to the CIA terrorist detention and
interrogation program. As the executive agent for implementing the terrorist detention and
interrogation program, the CIA is responsible for limiting access to such information in
accordance with the NSC's direction.
Declaration of Leon E. Panetta, Director, CIA, at T 30, ACLU v. Dep't of Def., 723 F. Supp. 2d 621
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 04-cv-4151) (emphasis added). In one of his first acts in office, President Obama
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Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG).'7 8  Finally, the NSC's central and
expanding role in the targeted killing process itself provides a compelling
argument that NSC exercises substantial independent authority.
B. Congressional Reassertion ofLegislative Intent
In addition, or alternatively (should courts prove unwilling to revisit
Armstrong), Congress could affirmatively reassert its legislative intent. Shortly
after Armstrong, members of Congress criticized the ruling as being contrary to
legislative intent.179 Congress has not, however, revisited the FOIA's definition
of agency to make the inclusion of the NSC more express- to avoid further
misinterpretation.
An explicit reassertion of congressional authority over the status of the
NSC under the FOIA and the FRA would present a number of benefits. First,
doing so would allow Congress to ensure its own ability to provide meaningful
oversight of the drone killing program (and other NSC activities).
Controversies last year over the President's refusal to provide members of
Congress with copies of legal opinions authorizing certain drone strikes
ordered the closure of CIA "detention facilities," forbidding the agency from operating prisons again.
Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009). An often-overlooked provision, however,
exempts "short-term, transitory" facilities from the order. Id. § 2(g). And, in a statement regarding
C.I.A. detention, Senator Dianne Feinstein lamented as "terrible mistakes" only "long-term, clandestine
'black sites."' Press Release, Feinstein Statement on CIA Detention, Interrogation Report (Dec. 13,
2012), http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?lD=46cOb685-a392-4400-a9a3
-5e058d29e635 (emphasis added). The effect of these distinctions is to preserve the CIA's ability to hold
prisoners directly, albeit only for a short term. While President Obama in the same executive order also
limited interrogation techniques to those listed in the Army Field Manual, that document was modified
in 2006 to permit stress positions, sleep deprivation, and isolation-methods potentially amounting to
torture. See, e.g., The U.S. Army Field Manual on Interrogation. A Strong Document in Need of Careful
Revision, HUM. RTS. FIRST, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/ArmyField Ma
nual.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2014). The controversial CIA program, then, retains some vitality despite
popular perception and official statements to the contrary.
178. See DoD Support to the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG), No.
3115.13, U.S. DEP'T DEF. 1 (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/311513p.pdf
(stating that its purpose is to assign responsibilities "in accordance with the National Security Council
'Charter for Operations of Interagency High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group'); Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Special Task Force on Interrogations and Transfer Policies Issues Its Recommendations
to the President (Aug. 24, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2009/August/09-ag-835.html
(recommending the creation of HIG and that it be subject to "policy guidance and oversight coordinated
by the National Security Council"). The NSC's Charter for the group is dated April 19, 2010, but is not
publicly available. Id. at 3; see also Mark Benjamin, Special Group Quietly Assists in Terrorist
Interrogations Under Obama, TIME, May 16, 2011 (stating that HIG is "reporting to the National
Security Council"); Anne E. Kornblut, New Unit to Question Key Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, Aug.
24, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/23/AR2009082302598.htmi
(stating that President Obama had approved the creation of HIG and that it would be "overseen by the
National Security Council").
179. See 142 CONG. REC. S10,716 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Patrick
Leahy) (stating that the D.C. Circuit excluded the NSC from FOIA "despite the fact that the NSC has
complied with FOIA for years under both Republican and Democratic Presidents"); id. at HI0,451
(statement of Rep. Carolyn Maloney) (stating that Armstrong decision was "contrary to 20 years of
freedom of information practice and contrary to the way Congress has treated the National Security
Council in other legislation").
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highlighted the limitations of congressional oversight and the contentious line
between presidential and congressional authority. so The administration's
treatment of all NSC records related to drone killings as "presidential records"
that can be destroyed at the President's discretion constitutes an assertion of
presidential power that Congress is empowered to curb by reasserting its
original statutory intent.
Second, a clear statutory amendment would have the benefit of precluding
future circuit splits while allowing Congress the ability to address methodically
the unique nature of the NSC and to ensure consistency with other relevant
statutory regimes, such as the PRA. 8 1
Finally, an express amendment to reassert legislative intent would provide
a meaningful check on the D.C. Circuit's application of the law to entities
beyond the NSC. In particular, the text of the FOIA unambiguously includes
the Executive Office of the President in the definition of an "agency" subject to
the FOIA.18 Yet, under the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of that statute over the
past two decades, less than half of the entities within the Executive Office of
the President are currently subject to the FOIA.m
C. Executive Branch Reevaluation
In addition to-or in the absence of-action by the courts or Congress, the
Executive should clarify what documentation is presently created regarding its
drone killings program and should both preserve past records and commit to
robust record-keeping going forward. Speeches by the President and senior
NSC officials who have been involved in the drone-killing program have
repeatedly sought to assure the public of the thorough and careful nature of
deliberations surrounding U.S. government killings outside of recognized
battlefields.184 Such statements ought to be supported by thorough and detailed
180. See, e.g., Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, White House Tactic for C.I.A. Bid Holds
Back Drone Memos, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/us/politics/strateg
y-seeks-to-ensure-bid-of-brennan-for-cia.html.
181. Congress could clarify, for example, the line between federal records and
presidential records. One option would be for Congress to codify the distinction the NSC itself made
during the decades it complied with the FOIA between NSC's "institutional files," which were subject to
the FOIA, and "presidential files" in its custody. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
182. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1) (2012) (defining "agency" to include an "establishment in
the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President)") (emphasis
added). The NSC has been part of the Executive Office of the President since 1949. Reorganization Plan
No. 4 of 1949, 14 Fed. Reg. 5227, 63 Stat. 1067.
183. Office ofAdministration-FOIA, supra note 125 (stating that Executive Office of
the President entities that are "exempt from the provisions of the FOIA" include the Office of
Administration, the White House Office, the Office of the Vice President, the Council of Economic
Advisers, the National Security Council, the Office of Policy Development, and the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board).
184. See, e.g., President Obama's May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note I (stating that
the drone killing process was subject to "clear guidelines, oversight and accountability"); Holder May
2013 Letter, supra note 28, at 3-4 (stating that targeting decisions are "subjected to an exceptionally
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documentation that could provide verification, at least in the eyes of successor
officials, pending declassification of those records in due time.
It is an extraordinarily grave matter for senior U.S. government officials
to sit on NSC committees that decide which individuals, including U.S.
citizens, will be killed. In that setting, it is difficult to see why documentation
ought to be less thorough than the court-reported transcripts created for even
routine federal court hearings.
Moreover, extensive documentation of such decisions is arguably what
would be required of a reasonable reading of the PRA, which mandates that
"the President shall take all such steps as may be necessary to assure that the
activities, deliberations, decisions, and policies that reflect the performance of
his constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties are
adequately documented."' 85 It remains unclear whether current documentation
practices focusing on the NSC's involvement in the drone killing program
satisfy this modest standard.
The President and senior officials have repeatedly promised greater
transparency on drone killings. Meaningful discretionary transparency from the
Executive, however, has been inadequate, both in perception and in reality. The
leaked White Paper, for example, provided an unprecedented measure of
transparency, but it also raised questions about why it had been deemed
initially necessary to withhold many of the details that the document
disclosed. 187
While the NSC would presumably never voluntarily submit to the FOIA,
the Executive ought to recognize that the burden might be comparatively low
and the value comparatively high. The NSC created a discretionary, quasi-
FOIA program in 1998, for example, which replicated at least a portion of
the burden and complexities of searching and reviewing NSC records that the
FOIA would require. Moreover, as Judge Tatel noted in his dissent in
Armstrong, many NSC documents would not be disclosed under the FOIA
because they would likely fall within one of the standard FOIA exemptions and
therefore "applying FOIA to the NSC presents little risk of improper intrusion
rigorous interagency legal review" and "extensive policy review at the highest levels of the U.S.
government").
185. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(a) (2012). As mentioned above, the power of the President
includes the ability to determine whether documents constitute presidential records, and therefore
whether the PRA applies at all. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
186. See DOJ White Paper, supra note 12.
187. In addition, disclosures of information regarding the legal authorization for drone
killings was first withheld from members of Congress and then made available in piecemeal fashion that
suggested the disclosures were being tied to ongoing confirmation hearings. See, e.g., Swaine, supra
note 12.
188. See Procedures for Obtaining Access to National Security Council (NSC) Records,
63 Fed. Reg. 25,737 (May 8, 1998) (providing "procedures for obtaining access to National Security
Council (NSC) records").
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into the President's exercise of his constitutional responsibilities."' At the
same time, the FOIA would ensure that disclosures were as broad as security
considerations would permit in furtherance of the same transparency the
President and other senior officials have promised.
Indeed, the problem with the NSC's voluntary record disclosures is
precisely that they are discretionary and not subject to the very judicial review
that-while carrying some risk that unwanted disclosure could be compelled-
also provides legitimacy and enforces a level of transparency by ensuring that
all "reasonably segregable" and releasable information is disclosed.'" That is,
the application of the FOIA could provide the Executive with a way to illustrate
that its promises of greater transparency are meaningful.
Relevant to both documentation and reasonable transparency of the drone
killing program is the President's May 2013 announcement that the "playbook"
for drone killing, which had been discussed at length in news reports based on
unofficial accounts sourced to unnamed officials, had been committed to
official form in "Presidential policy guidance."' 9 1 This "playbook" supposedly
bureaucratizes the drone killing process and may provide detailed guidance on
the documentation created and preserved to ensure long-term accountability for
drone killing. It is, unfortunately, not public, has not been voluntarily disclosed,
and is, according to the executive branch, immune to the FOIA.
Conclusion
The role of the NSC in drone killings is to debate and decide whether
individuals, including U.S. citizens, will be killed in U.S. strikes outside of
recognized battlefields. To describe such decisions as among the most
controversial and significant that the government makes is far from hyperbole.
According to unofficial accounts of such NSC meetings, moreover, debate over
the facts, the law, and broader policy has been extensive and sometimes fierce.
One example can be found in the publicly available description of a 2010
conference call initiated by NSC Legal Counsel Mary DeRosa to "nail down
final approval" for the drone targeting of Sheikh Mukhtar Robow, an alleged
leader within the al-Shabab organization in Somalia.192 Department of Defense
General Counsel Jeh Johnson reportedly stated that he believed that Robow
could be lawfully targeted.193 State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh,
189. Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 579 (1996) (Tatel, J.,
dissenting).
190. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012).
191. President Obama's May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note I ("[O]ver the last 4 years,
my administration has worked vigorously to establish a framework that governs our use of force against
terrorists-insisting upon clear guidelines, oversight, and accountability-that is now codified in a
Presidential policy guidance that I signed yesterday.").
192. See, e.g., KLAIDMAN,supra note 23, at 221.
193. Id. at 221-22.
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however, "vigorously" disagreed, arguing, based on his own reading of the
available intelligence, that Robow was leading a Shabab faction that actually
opposed attacking the United States. 194 Reportedly, the NSC's DeRosa
"brushed Koh off, telling him she understood his policy concerns," to which
Koh "pushed back hard," arguing that it was not simply a matter of policy, but
law.195 Koh reportedly ended his argument by "slowly and emphatically"
telling the NSC's DeRosa that "[t]he State Department legal adviser, for the
record, believes this killing would be unlawful." 96
The central issue is whether, in fact, an adequate "record" of such crucial
debates, dissents, and justifications is being both created and preserved. If the
law does not compel such recordkeeping-and in the executive branch's view
the law currently does not-then that leaves political incentives alone, which
discourage maintaining such records. The publicly available account of the
NSC debate over Robow, for example, noted the implications of Koh's
objection. "The White House hated dissent among the lawyers. If word leaked
that Robow was killed against the explicit advice of the State Department, it
could cause a scandal."l 97
Moreover, while Robow was reportedly not targeted, reasons abound for
officials not to maintain documentation of approved and executed strikes that
might result in "mistakes" or constitute unlawful overstepping. While, in
theory, the executive branch ought to have internal incentives compelling the
maintenance of a detailed record to enable the systematic examination and
correction of errors, misidentifications, and reliance on faulty intelligence, the
courts have noted that executive agencies instead "have a built-in incentive to
destroy records relating to 'mistakes."'"98 This reality, combined with the
executive branch's vigorous argument defending the President's claimed
authority to destroy NSC records relating to drone killings "that neither the
Archivist, nor Congress, nor the court may veto," 99 presents a serious risk to
long-term accountability.
Courts have expressed frustration at their own lack of oversight over an
executive killing program that appears "on its face incompatible with our
Constitution,"200 and Congress has protested a lack of executive branch
transparency about the program. Both are in a position to create a meaningful
check on the Executive and ensure a measure of accountability simply by
194. Id. at 222.
195. Id. (emphasis added).
196. Id. (emphasis added).
197. Id.
198. Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
199. Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion To Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim at
7, Main Street Legal Servs., Inc. v. Nat'l Sec. Council, 2013 WL 3094836 (E.D.N.Y. June 7, 2013) (No.
13-cv-00948).
200. New York Times, v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 515-16 (S.D.N.Y.
2013), affd in part, rev'd in part, 2014 WL 1569514 (2d Cir. Apr. 21, 2014).
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reasserting the application of the FOIA and the FRA to the NSC, as originally
intended.
The grandfather of Abdulrahman al-Awlaqi, the U.S. teenager whose
drone killing government officials privately admitted was an "outrageous
mistake,"20 1 asked in a 2013 New York Times op-ed: "The government has
killed a 16-year-old American boy. Shouldn't it at least have to explain
why?"202 The answer to that question is currently classified. It is a modest
proposition that the government should be legally required to ensure the
existence and preservation of relevant records so that the answer can one day
be known.
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201. DeYoung, supra note 46.
202. Nasser al-Awlaki, Op-Ed., The Drone That Killed My Grandson, N.Y. TIMES, July
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